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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)
)
)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
A. L. CRIPPS and WALTER
)
CRIPPS,
)
)
Defendants and Respondents. )

CENTURIAN CORPORATION,

SUPREME COURT No. 16971

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

)
)
)
)
)
)

PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC.,
Plaintiff in Intervention,
Respondent,
vs.

~
~

CENTURIAN CORPORATION,
RICHARD NICKLES and
MARGARET K. NICKLES,
Defendants in Intervention
Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF CASE
Centurian Corporation ("Centurian") brought an action
against A. L. Cripps and Walter A. Cripps ("Cripps"), claiming a
delinquent amount due under a lease agreement to repossess a
tank trailer, the subject matter of the lease.

Subsequently,

Petty Motor Lease, Inc. ("Petty"), claiming to be the owner of
the vehicle leased by Centurian to Cripps moved to intervene in
the action.

The motion to intervene was granted.

case was filed in a separte number and file.

However, the

Trial was held
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July 13, 1976.

The trial court, in a memorandum decision and in

the judgment, held that it was without jurisdiction of the
complaint of Petty against the defendants in intervention,
Centurian Corporation, Richard Nickles and Margaret K. Nickles.
Petty appealed and Centurian and Nickles cross-appealed.
This court remanded the matter back to the trial court and the
trial court gave relief to Petty as against Centurian and
Nickles but denied relief to Centurian and Nickles as against
Cripps.

Both Petty and Centurian/Nickles sought additional

relief of the trial court by way of motions to amend, but both
motions were denied.

Centurian and Nickles timely perfected

this appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellants Centurian and Nickles seek a reversal of the
trial court and a judgment in their favor against Petty; or in
the alternative a reduction in the judgment in favor of Petty
together with relief against Cripps in whatever amount Petty
obtains against Appellants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In February 1973, Centurian and Nickles leased a new
1973 trans-liner semi tank trailer from Petty.

The lease is

dated February 1, 1973 and is guaranteed by Richard H. Nickles
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and Margaret K. Nickles individually.

(Exhibit 7-I}

At the

same time an additional document was executed wherein Centurian,
at the end of the lease agreed to purchase, after all payments
under the lease have been paid, for the sum of $621.00.

This

document is guaranteed by Richard H. Nickles only and not by
Margaret K. Nickles.

(Exhibit 8-I}

Centurian used the trailer for a few loads and then
leased the same to Cripps.

Cripps was to hold Centurian and

Nickles harmless under the terms of the lease and or purchase
agreement.

(Exhibit P-1)

It was admitted by Cripps at trial

that they were in default of the payments as required by Exhibit
P-1 and the trial court granted judgment for all past due payments on the trailer to Centurian.
In February or March 1974, the tank trailer was stolen
by a person or persons unknown.
the Carbon County Sheriff.

This theft was duly reported to

(Record, 269: Exhibit 4-P}

At the

time of said theft, Centurian/Nickles was current on the obligation to Petty.

(Exhibit 9-I}

Exhibit 7-I, which was drafted by Petty, specifically
required Centurian/Nickles to provide insurance for public
liability.

The provisions relating to insurance coverage for

fire, theft, comprehensive and collision have been left blank,
but does recite that Petty may have in effect insurance coverage
for fire, theft, comprehensive and collision and that if Centurian/Nickles furnishes a policy for this coverage, then Petty
would cancel their own coverage.
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The lease further provides for termination automatically if any rental payment is not paid within ten {10) days of
the due date.,
March.
Cripps.

There was a payment due on March 15, 1974 for

No payment was made by either Centurian/Nickles and/or
There was a deposit of $3,594.63 made on February 1,

1973 to insure faithful performance of the lease and return of
the property.

If there is a violation of the lease agreement,

Petty may retain such portion to compensate for the loss or
damage.

{Exhibit 7-I)
In the first proceeding, Centurian/Nickles was granted

judgment only as to the past due installments per Exhibit P-1
and attorney's fees {Record 105-110), while specifically holding
that the trailer had been stolen on/or about March 15, 1974 and
that no evidence was introduced of Cripps' negligence or that
Cripps had failed to properly take care of the trailer. {Record
109)
The trial court, on remand held that Petty and Centurian/Nickles {both Nickles) had entered into a purchase
agreement and that the sum of $12,367.37 was due on said agreement.

Although the court had heretofore dismissed Cripps'

counterclaim {Record 110), the trial court concluded that Cripps
owed no liability to Centurian/Nickles.

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXHIBITS 7-I AND
8-I CONSTITUTE A SALE.
There is no dispute that the parties executed Exhibits 7-I
and 8-I, insofar as they bear the signatures of the respective
parties.

Exhibit 7-I is labelled "Lease."

The terms all discuss

a lease.

There are no provisions of purchase in Exhibit 7-I.
Exhibit 8-I, labelled, "Agreement of Sale and Purchase,"

drafted by Petty, is conditional and does not constitute a sale
under the Uniform Commercial Code.

The language of condition is

as follows:
User has leased from Owner a 1973 trans-liner
semi-tank trailer, Serial No. 151472, and desires
to purchase said unit at the termination of the
lease, after all payments called for by the lease
have been paid, and the Owner desires to sell the
unit to User at that time.
This is clearly a provision giving Centurian the right
to purchase at the termination of the lease and after all payments have been made.

The lease provides in paragraph 6.

This lease may be terminated at any time during
the period of the Lease. • • • If this Lease is
terminated by either Owner or User for any reason
or expires as provided in paragraph 1, hereof,
User agrees to pay to Owner any and all past due
payments • • . plus the final lease payment in
full, and • • • 45 percent of the monthly rental
multiplied by the number of months the lease has
yet to run • • • • • "
Centurian had the right, at any time, to terminate the
lease.

If it had so elected, the trailer was to be returned

less reasonable wear and tear and the liquidated damages as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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provided in paragraph 6 would apply.

The Uniform Commercial

Code defines in Section 70A-2-106, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, a sale as:
A "Sale" consists in the passing of title from
the seller to the buyer for a price • • • •
Title to the trailer in question always remained in Petty during
the term of the Lease.

The language of Exhibit 8-I is con-

trolling and discloses that only upon:
• The termination of the lease, after all
payments called for by the lease have been paid,
and the Owner desires to sell unit to User at
that time. {emphasis supplied)
is there an intent or desire to pass title to buyer from seller
for a price.

The words "at that time" refer back to the condi-

tions of termination of the Lease and all payments called for by
the lease have been made.

The unrebutted testimony and admis-

sion by Petty is:
Q.
{By Mr. Petty) Now, Mr. Petty, I show you
what's been marked as Exhibit 8-I, and I'll ask
you if you recognize that document?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Would you described it for the Court?

A. Yes, it's a purchase agreement to be effective at the end of the lease which I just
described. After the lease payments have been
made, then the purchase agreement is for $621 to
be effective at the end of the lease. {Record
276, 277)
Petty admitted the so called "sale" was to be effective
after the lease payments have been made.

Mr. Petty further

testified at page 279:
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Has Centurian Corporation ever been delinquent on this lease?

Q.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Since what date?

A. Since March of '74. They were delinquent a
little bit at--for short periods before that a
time or two, but since March of '74 they have
been delinquent.
The provisions of the lease state:
That Owner hereby leases to User • • • • which
lease shall be strictly under the following terms
and conditions:
1. User agrees to pay to Owner as rental
for the use of said property the sum of $580.00
per month. • • • If any rental payment is not
paid within 10 days after the due date thereof,
this lease shall automatically expire.
(emphasis
added)
This Lease expired, by its own terms, on the 25th day
of March, 1974.

At that point in time, not all of the payments

called for under the lease had been made.

These covenants and

conditions precedent were not complied with and hence there
could not be a valid enforceable contract of sale.

POINT II
EVEN IF THERE IS A CONTRACT OF SALE, MARGARET K.
NICKLES IS NOT BOUND TO SAID SALE, SINCE SHE IS
NOT A PARTY TO SAID AGREEMENT.
The trial court relied on a construction of both Exhibits 7-I and 8-I together to form a "sale."

Exhibit 8-I does

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not bear the signature of Margarent K. Nickles.

It is elemen-

tary that in order to hold Margaret K. Nickles personally
liable, she would have to be signatory to said agreement.

POINT III
THE LEASE AGREEMENT PLACES THE RISK OF THEFT ON
PETTY ABSENT NEGLIGENCE ON BEHALF OF CENTURIAN/NICKLES.
The Lease agreement provides in part:
The (
) agrees to maintain • • • fire,
theft, comprehensive • • • insurance on the above
described property, which insurance shall provide
protection for Owner and User as their interests
may appear. • • • Owner may have in effect at
the commencement of this lease fire, theft, comprehensive • • • insurance. If User furnishes
Owner with evidence of satisfactory insurance
coverage within fifteen days from the commencement of the lease, Owner's insurance policy shall
be terminated with no expense to User. However,
if evidence of satisfactory insurance coverage
has not been furnished by User within fifteen
days of the commencment of this lease, User shall
pay to Owner the total premium under such
insurance policy of Owner and that policy may be
kept in full force and effect during the term of
this lease.
Petty drafted the agreement.

It is a form used over

the years specifically prepared by Petty.

Petty, in preparing

this contract, filled in the preceding insurance provision
wherein Centurian was made responsible for obtaining liability
coverage.

Petty left the fire and theft blank.

By doing so

Petty assumed that risk since Petty is the owner of the property
and title had not passed.

Centurian had no knowledge of whether

Petty had fire and theft coverage, but the language would lead
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one to believe Petty had this coverage in mind and had taken
steps to cover this risk.
The uncontroverted evidence discloses that Petty had
actual knowledge of the sub-lease agreement (and/or sale) to
Cripps.

At page 74 of the record there appears an assignment,

wherein Petty acknowledges the Centurian-Cripps Agreement and
gives Centurian all right and interest to pursue its cause of
action.

Centurian did not have possession of, nor control of,

the trailer at the time of its loss by theft.

Mr. Walter Cripps

testified at page 269:
Q. When was the last time that you saw the
trailer.

A.

February of '74.

Q.

And where was it at that time?

A.

Henry Mills' property in Lower Middle Creek.

Q.

Where is that?

A.

South of Price about four miles.

Q.

Carbon County?

A.

Carbon County.

Q.

Do you know where the trailer is today?

A.

I do not.

Where is Lower Middle Creek?

Q. Have you a record--well, what has happened to
the trailer? Do you know what has happened to it?

A. The trailer was stolen, taken off from Henry
Mills' property without permission.
Q. Did you make any report of that to the
authorities?
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A. As soon as I found out it was stolen I
reported it.
Calling your attention to Exhibit 4P, were
you the person who reported that missing trailer
on that particular date?

Q.

A. To the best of my knowledge that is true and
correct.
The trial court found, at page 109 of the record:
12. That on or about March 15, 1974, the tank
trailer was stolen.
13. The record is absolutely devoid of any
evidence that Defendants were negligent or failed
to take proper care to the tank trailer so as to
prevent it from being stolen.
Centurian/Nickles did not even have possession of the
trailer at the time of the theft, but were seeking to obtain
possession by way of a Writ of Replevin.

The law has long been

established under circumstances of bailment for hire that in the
absence of negligence the bailee is not liable for an act of a
third party intervenor.

In 8 Am.Jur.2d Bailments §201 by the

following language:
Unless a bailee has violated his contract he will
not be liable in the absence of negligence, for
loss of injury in respect to the thing bailed,
resulting from the inherent nature of the property itself or some infirmity thereof, from
disaster or accidental casualty or from robbery,
burglary, or theft.
This general law has been applied by this court in the
case of Barlow Upholstry and Furniture Co. v. Emmel, 533 P.2d
900 (Utah 1975).

In the case of Stehle Equipment Co. v. Alpha

Construction & Dev. Co., 247 Md. 210, 230 A.2d 654 (1967) the
Maryland court in addressing this question stated at page 655:
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In its brief, appellee conceded that there was a
bailment for hire which imposed upon the bailee
an obligation to exercise ordinary care and
diligence in using and safeguarding the bailed
property and to return it in as good condition,
ordinary wear and tear excepted, as when it was
received. (citations omitted) Once appellant
proved the delivery, the bailment for hire, and
the unexplained failure to return the property in
its condition when received, a prima facie case
of negligence was made out. However, where the
loss was accounted for as having been occasioned
by a cause which would excuse the bailee, the
defense was complete unless the bailer followed
by showing that the bailee, by the exercise of
ordinary care, might have avoided the injury.
(citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
This same view has been held by the Texas court in
Tuloma Rigging, Inc. v. Barge and Crane Rentals, Etc., 460
S.W.2d 510 (Texas 1970) wherein it states:
We think it is the law that if a lessee, without
fault, is denied useful possession of the leased
property, the purpose of the lease agreement is
so frustrated as to discharge lessee of his obligation further to pay rent. A mutual benefit
bailee is not liable if the subject-matter of the
bailment has been injured by some internal decay,
by accident, or by some other means wholly without his fault, and in the absence of some special
stipulation, as injury to or loss of the property
usually falls on the bailer. The bailee, however,
is required to exercise ordinary care to preserve
and protect the bailed property in the absence of
agreements providing otherwise.
(citations
omitted and emphasis supplied)
To the same effect is the Grav Eagles, Inc. v.
Lucchese, 37 Mich. App. 322, 194 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. 1972).

The

act of theft was an independant act over which Centurian/Nickles
had no control.

The only possible thrust of negligence would be

the choosing of Cripps as a sub-lessee.

No allegation exists of
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said negligence, nor was any proof offered by any party of any
negligence on behalf of anyone.
A.

It is therefore submitted that:

Petty assumed the risk by the insurance pro-

visions of the contract (Exhibit 7-1).
B.

Petty as bailer assumed that risk as a matter

of law absent any negligence on the part of Centur ian/Nickles and/or Cripps.
Since the subject matter of the lease itself no longer
exists, there can be no performance demanded of Centurian/Nickles
by Petty absent that element of negligence.
in full through the time of the theft.

The lease was paid

Thereafter, no further

payments were due, since Petty could no longer perform its part
of the bargain, to wit: no trailer.

POINT IV
CENTURIAN/NICKLES IS ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION
FROM CRIPPS
Assuming arguendo, that the trial court is correct
Centurian/Nickles is entitled to indemnification from Cripps.
Exhibit P-1 states in part:
Purchaser [Cripps] agrees that he will hold
seller [Centurian] harmless from and does hereby
assume and agree to pay Exhibit "A" attached
hereto.
Exhibit "A" to P-1 is the combination of the Lease and
Agreement of Sale and Purchase.

The trial court held that

Centurian had requested PIE to ground the trailer and had
therefore breached its lease with Cripps.

Centurian had that
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right under the PIE lease.
I

Cripps was in default by their own

admission at page 264:
Q [by Mr. Bryner] Mrs. Cripps, do you admit
there was a delinquency for the month of October.
A.

Yes.

And do you admit there was a delinquency for
the month of November.

Q.

A.

Yes.

The agreement between Centurian and Cripps provides:
In the event of any default in the payments
reserved to seller herein, the seller shall have
the right to repossess said tank trailer unit
with or without legal process • • . • •
It was December 19, 1973, when Centurian "grounded" the
trailer (well after the admitted default of Cripps).

Mr. Cripps

testified:
Q. Well, my question was: Why did you not
operate the trailer after December 19, 1973?

A. Well, Mr. Nickles grounded it from PIE, and I
cound't put it to work with PIE. (Record 269)
Mr. Nickles testified at page 255 and 256:
[by Mr. Bryner] During the month of December, and specifically around the 19th of December
of 1973, isn't it true that you contacted Pacific
Intermountain Express and asked them to ground
that trailer?

Q.

A. I believe that was as a--after the conclusion
of a meeting with Mr. Cripps personally in our
parking lot where he refused to give us the money
from two checks he had in his possession. Then
we asked that the equipment be grounded.
The demand on him at that time was made for
the equipment. We told him the transaction
wasn't satisfactory.
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All right. I'm not asking you that. I'm
asking whether or not you did contact anyone at
PIE with the intent of essentially grounding the
trailer?

Q.

A.

I believe so; yes.

Q. If you contacted PIE for the purpose of
having the trailer grounded, it's true is it not,
then, the trailer was not in New Mexico?
A. We didn't know where the trailer was. The
purpose of calling PIE was to put an end
to--impound it in their yard when it came back.
The object was not for them to let it go if it
came back at all.
Q. In other words, you indicated to them that
you did not want that trailer to further operate
if it came into their yard?

A.

Into their possession; yes.

Centurian had every contractual right to try and get
possession of the trailer with or without legal recourse.
Centurian had the right, as one of the lessors of the equipment,
to instruct PIE to impound the same.
the trailer was stolen.

PIE did not do so.

Later,

Said act of "grounding" the trailer was

in conformity with Exhibit P-1.

POINT V
DAMAGES ASSESSED ARE INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE LAW,
AND THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES ARE IN THE NATURE OF A
PENALTY.
The damages assessed by the trial court are based upon
an agreement of purchase and does not take into consideration
the terms of the lease and prospective sale.

That point will
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not be reargued here.

However, the lease does provide that

damages of 45% of the monthly rental ($580.00) for the remaining
monthly payments left on said lease, together with the last
monthly payment in full is to be paid if the lease is terminated
early by either party.

This is to apply even if termination is

under paragraph 1 which states in part:
If the rental payment is not paid within 10 days
after the due date thereof, this lease shall
automatically expire.
The March 15, 1974 payment was not made nor any thereafter.

On March 25, 1974 there was no lease in force, it had

been automatically terminated.

There would be 20 installments

due of $508.00 which equals $10,160.00.

Forty-five percent of

$10,160.00 equals $4,572.00, plus the last installment of $508.00
equals $5,080.00 less the deposit of $3,594.63 equals a net due
of $1,485.37.
However, the foregoing really has no bearing to the
actual damages sustained since the trailer was stolen and no
damages were in fact incurred beyond Petty's own risk.

In the

case of Brown v. Rennels, 539 P.2d 1312 (Colo. 1975) the court
held:
• • • [L]iquidated damages are not recoverable in
addition to actual damages." (citations omitted)
Therefore, Petty is, as a matter of law, entitled to actual
damages.

There are no actual damages in this instance because

of the theft.

Petty is also estopped to assert liquidated
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damages since there can be no further rents due since the subject matter of the lease is no longer available for Centurian
use.

POINT VI
PETTY OWES CENTURIAN/NICKLES THE SUM OF $3,594.63.
Petty either assumed the risk of theft unless the contractual arrangements on insurance coverage and/or assumed that
risk as bailer.

There was a deposit acknowledged received by

Petty in the amount of $3,594.63 to insure performance of the
monthly payments.

The contract states in part:

User agrees to deposit with Owner the sum of
$3,594.63 to be held by Owner, without interest,
until all terms of this lease have been faithfully performed and the property returned to
Owner in a satisfactory condition, whereupon said
deposit shall be returned to User.
Petty breached the lease agreement by not being able to
give to Centurian/Nickles the quiet and peaceful prossession and
use of the trailer after it was stolen, nor did Petty replace
said trailer.

Therefore, Centurian/Nickles is entitled to the

return of the deposit since at the time of the theft all sums
had been paid to the theft denied Centurian/Nickles the useful
possession of the leased property.

The lessee is discharged of

any further obligation to pay rent thereafter, see Tuloma,
supra, p. 513.
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CONCLUSION

The trial court erred in concluding that there was a
sale and should have held there was only a lease with a conditional future sale which did not materialize.

Centurian/Nickles

is entitled to a judgment in its favor as against Petty in the
amount of $3,594.63 or in the alternative Centurian/Nickles is
entitled to judgment against Cripps for full indemnification.
In no event should any judgment be entered as against
Margaret K. Nickles since she is not a guarantor of the so
called "Agreement of Sale and Purchase."
Respectf~!lY
,,

submitted,
NN
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